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Abstract 
 
 I consider a new model of an infinitely repeated preemption game with random 
matching, termed the recurrent preemption game, wherein each player’s discount factor 
depends on whether she wins the current game. This model describes sequential 
strategic technology adoptions in which a company becomes outdated by failing to 
maintain a position at the forefront of innovation. Assuming incomplete information 
about the presence of a rival, I clarify how the prominence of the innovator’s dilemma 
influences the degree of excessive competition in preemption. I also reveal interesting 
properties demonstrated by the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the recurrent 
preemption game. 
 
Keywords: Recurrent Preemption Game, Strategic Technology Adoption, Innovator’s 
Dilemma, Unique Equilibrium, Random Technology. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This study investigates the recurrent preemption game, which is defined as a new 
version of an infinitely repeated game with random matching. The component game is a 
simple form of Bertrand duopoly that I term the preemption game. I assume incomplete 
information in that each player does not know whether her rival is present or absent. 
This game mainly departs from existing repeated games in that the discount factor (or 
the survival rate) of each player is not constant across component games and instead 
depends on the state and the consequence of the current component game, such as 
whether a player’s rival is present and whether she wins the current game. This study 
shows that the recurrent preemption game demonstrates the unique symmetric Nash 
equilibrium, and reveals various important properties of this equilibrium. 
This study situates the recurrent preemption game within the following dynamics 
of sequential strategic technology adoptions. A company attempts to develop and adopt 
a new technology within a limited time interval. If the company successfully adopts the 
technology earlier than its rival, then it earns the corresponding time-dependent 
adoption value as the winner’s payoff; otherwise, it earns nothing. By postponing the 
timing of adoption, the company can further develop the technology and increase this 
adoption value, but the risk of being preempted by its rival increases at the same time. 
 Just after the end of the time interval, the company can enter the next preemption 
game with a positive probability; the rival in the next game is different from the rival in 
the current game due to the randomness of matching. Importantly, only one of the two 
companies in the current game will progress to the next game. Hence, the two 
companies are rivals in two respects: 1) they are rivals in the scramble over the next 
opportunity for technology adoption, and 2) they are rivals in the competition for 
preempting the adoption of the current technology. 
 I specifically focus on the situation in which the likelihood of the winner entering 
the next game is not the same as the likelihood of the loser entering the next game. The 
likeliness of each outcome crucially depends on the relative importance between the 
following winner’s advantage and disadvantage. The case in which the loser is more 
likely to enter the next game than the winner corresponds to the prominence of the 
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winner’s disadvantage and is termed the innovator’s dilemma (Christensen 1997; Igami 
2017): the winner is constrained by the current technology, and therefore tends to be 
behind of the loser in starting the development of the next technology. Meanwhile, the 
case in which the winner is more likely to enter the next game than the loser 
corresponds to the prominence of the winner’s (i.e., the innovator’s) advantage: the 
winner outweighs the loser in technical and information-gathering skills. This study 
clarifies that the relative importance between the innovator’s dilemma and advantage is 
crucial for understanding strategic behavior. 
To be more concrete, I envision the following scenario behind the recurrent 
preemption game. A commercial company generally wants to ensure its long-term 
survival in emerging industries. To do so, it must constantly ride the tide of innovations 
that create new markets through competition across existing industries. However, the 
presence of a rival company can threaten its ability to remain at the forefront of the next 
innovation. Once a company loses its forefront position, its growth can quickly slow 
and it can become outdated. 
Importantly, the company that wins the current race of technology adoption can 
also succeed in developing talent with the ability to discover and develop the next 
technology. However, the innovator’s dilemma recalls that the winner of the current 
adoption race may not necessarily win the next opportunity—the loser of the current 
adoption race may headhunt the talent developed by the winner. Moreover, the 
company that successfully enters the next opportunity may still have a rival in the form 
of either a new venture or a company that previously worked in a different industry. 
With this scenario in mind, the recurrent preemption game sharply distinguishes 
between the following two conflicts between the rivals in the current technology 
adoption. The first conflict is about meeting the next opportunity for technology 
adoption, which is expressed by the dependence of each player’s discount factor on 
whether she wins the current game. The second conflict is the first-come, first-served 
style of the race for current technology adoption, which is expressed by the current, 
one-shot preemption game. This study is the first theoretical attempt to incorporate this 
first conflict into strategic technology adoption. 
For our purposes, it is important to note that this study is related to existing 
literature on timing games (and specifically preemption games) in which various aspects 
5 
 
of incomplete information are incorporated. Notable works here include those by 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), Brunnermeier and 
Morgan (2010), Hopenhayn and Squintani (2011), Bobtcheff and Mariotti (2012), and 
Matsushima (2013; forthcoming). In contrast to this study, these works commonly 
investigate static games. 
The theoretical advantage of this study’s model is that it involves the unique 
symmetric Nash equilibrium. In this respect, this study is closely related to 
Matsushima’s (2013; forthcoming), which assumed incomplete information implying 
that each player expects that her rival is absent (or irrational) with a positive probability, 
and showed the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. This study extends this uniqueness 
to the recurrent preemption game by adding the symmetry constraint. 
The unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in the recurrent preemption game makes 
clear that the above-mentioned first conflict has the following significant effects on 
strategic behavior. The prominence of the innovator’s dilemma eases preemptive 
competition and consequently promotes more efficient technology adoption, while the 
prominence of the innovator’s advantage worsens preemptive competition and 
consequently promotes less efficient technology adoption. The players’ degrees of 
competitiveness from the viewpoint of the second conflict depend on the difference 
between the level of the current technology’s adoption value and the average level. 
Importantly, the manner of this dependence substantially differs based on the 
prominences of the innovator’s dilemma and advantage. If the innovator’s dilemma is 
prominent, then player competitiveness in the equilibrium will increase as the level of 
adoption value increases. On the other hand, if the innovator’s advantage is prominent, 
then player competitiveness in the equilibrium will decrease as the level of adoption 
value increases. This difference is due to the fact that the higher the quality of the 
current technology, the less important the first conflict. 
In this respect, the work of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) is related to this study, 
although it does differ substantially. More specifically, Rotemberg and Saloner studied 
a repeated oligopoly game with business fluctuations and showed that excessive price 
competition (e.g., price war) takes place in a boom because business fluctuations 
influence the relative importance between the instantaneous gains and the punishments 
in future games. In contrast, this study does not consider such future punishments, and 
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instead considers the dependence of a player’s discount factor on whether she wins the 
current component game: the excessive preemption competition takes place with a high 
level of adoption value if and only if the innovator’s dilemma is prominent. 
This study assumes that the rival in the current game is different from the rival in 
the next game. In this respect, this study is related to studies of repeated games such as 
those by Kandori (1992) and Deb, Sugaya, and Wolitzky (forthcoming), wherein 
players are randomly matched across component games. These works investigate 
community enforcements by assuming that a player can obtain information concerning 
the opponent’s past history of play. In contrast, this study does not make this 
assumption: a player cannot even confirm that her rival is really present until the current 
game ends. 
This study assumes that the development and adoption of the next technology do 
not affect the adoption value of the current technology. Accordingly, this study does not 
consider the replacement effect (Arrow 1962) that makes the incumbent hesitant to 
innovate—while the replacement effect may be one cause of the innovator’s dilemma 
(Igami 2017), it is not the only cause (Christensen 1997). We conceptually distinguish 
between the innovator’s dilemma and the replacement effect based on the 
above-mentioned headhunting scenario. 
 The organization of this study is as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic 
formulation of the recurrent preemption game, where I assume that the level of adoption 
value is constant across component games. Section 3 incorporates uncertainty about 
future technologies into the recurrent preemption game. Section 4 generalizes the 
formulation of the winner’s payoffs without substantial changes to the contents outlined 
in Sections 2 and 3. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Basic Model 
 
2.1. Formulation 
 
 I investigated a two-player infinitely repeated game with random matching that I 
termed the recurrent preemption game. The component game is given by ( , , )N A u , 
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where {1,2}N  , 1 2A A A  , 1 2( , )u u u , and :iu A R  for each {1, 2}i . Each 
player {1, 2}i  simultaneously selects an action i ia A , and obtains the instantaneous 
payoff ( )iu a , where 1 2( , )a a a . I specify the component game by 
1 2 [0,1]A A  , 
    ( )i iu a a  and ( ) 0ju a   if i ja a , 
and 
    1 2( ) ( ) 2
tu a u a      if 1 2t a a  , 
where j i  and 0  . I call this the preemption game, and it corresponds to the 
simple Bertrand duopoly. Each player i  wins and obtains the winner’s payoff ia  if 
her action choice ia  is smaller than the rival’s action choice ja . 
 The preemption game involves the unique Nash equilibrium. The unique Nash 
equilibrium incentivizes each player to select 0ia  , which exhausts her potential 
benefit. To calm this inefficiency, I assume incomplete information: each player i N  
does not know if her rival j  is present or absent; she expects that with a positive 
probability 0  , her rival j i  is absent and therefore she automatically wins and 
obtains ia . With this incomplete information, the preemption game demonstrates the 
unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. This unique equilibrium incentivizes each 
player to select positive actions with certainty. 
A mixed strategy—or, to it put less formally for my purpose, a strategy—for 
player i  is defined as a cumulative distribution function : [0,1]i iq A  , where ( )iq t  
is non-decreasing and right continuous in [0,1]t . I simply wrote iq t  when player 
i  selects ia t  with certainty. A strategy profile 1 2( , )q q  is said to be symmetric if 
1 2q q . I simply wrote q  instead of 1 2( , )q q  when 1 2q q q  . According to my 
earlier works (2013; forthcoming), the following strategy is the unique Nash 
equilibrium in one-shot preemption games: 
    * * (1 )( ) ( | ) 1 (1 )
tq t q t
t
 
     for all [ ,1]t  , 
and 
8 
 
    * *( ) ( | ) 0q t q t    for all [0, ]t  . 
 The interpretation of the preemption game is strategic technology adoption. A 
company has an opportunity to develop and adopt a technology within a time interval 
[0,1] . If the company successfully adopts the technology at a time [0,1]t , then it 
earns t , where   expresses the level of adoption value. Meanwhile, if the 
company’s rival adopts the technology before it does, then the company earns nothing. 
While postponing the time of adoption allows a company to further develop its 
technology, it increases the risk that the company’s rival will win the adoption race. 
 I introduce the recurrent structure as follows. Just after terminal time 1, the 
company can enter the next preemption game with a positive probability. I assume that 
the rival in the next game is not the rival in the current game. To be sure, if there is no 
rival in the current game, then the company enters the next game with certainty. 
However, if there is a rival in the current game, then the company enters the next game 
with a probability of [0,1]W   if it wins the current game, and a probability of 
1 [0,1]L W     if it loses the current game. 
 Hence, the recurrent preemption game is a substantial modification of a standard 
infinitely repeated game with random matching in that the discount factor of a player 
depends on whether she wins the current game and also on whether there is a rival in the 
current game. To be more precise, the discount factor equals 1 if the rival is absent in 
the current game, W  if the rival is present and the player wins the current game, and 
1 W  ( L ) if the rival is present and wins the current game. 
 In the context of strategic technology adoption, the innovator (i.e., the winner) is at 
risk of her competitor (i.e., the loser) taking her opportunity to participate in the next 
race for technology adoption. The case that the loser will enter the next game more 
likely than the winner ( 12W  ) corresponds to the prominence of the innovator’s 
dilemma that the winner is constrained by the current technology, and therefore tends to 
be behind of the loser in starting the development of the next technology. Meanwhile, 
the case in which the winner is more likely to enter the next game than the loser 
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( 12W  ) corresponds to the prominence of the innovator’s advantage, that is, that the 
winner obtains better technical and information-gathering skills than the loser. 
I use ( ) ( | , , )WV q V q     to denote the expected payoff for a player in the 
recurrent preemption game when all players commonly follow a strategy q . The 
winner and the loser receive 
( )Wt V q   and (1 ) ( )W V q , 
as their respective payoffs, where t  denotes the winning time. If a player selects 
[0,1]t , then she wins the current game against her rival with a probability of 
( ) lim ( )1 2
t
q t q   and therefore receives the expected payoff given by 
      ( ) lim ( )( , ) (1 ) ( ) 1 2 tW
q t q
V t q t V q 
             
 
( ) lim ( )(1 ) ( ) 2
t
W
q t q
V q 
    
 ( )t V q   , 
that is, 
(1)    ( ) lim ( )( , ) 1 (1 ) 2
t
q t q
V t q t 
         
 
( ) lim ( )(1 ) (1 2 ) ( )2
t
W W
q t q
V q
                 
. 
From (1), I define the expected payoff in the recurrent preemption game as 
    
1
0
( ) ( , ) ( )
t
V q V t q dq t

  1
0
( ) lim ( )1 (1 ) ( )2
t
t
q t q
t dq t
  

         
1
0
( ) lim ( )( ) (1 ) (1 2 ) ( )2
t
W W
t
q t q
V q dq t
   

               , 
that is, 
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(2)    
1
0
1
0
( ) lim ( )1 (1 ) ( )2( ) ( ) lim ( )1 (1 ) (1 2 ) ( )2
t
t
t
W W
t
q t q
t dq t
V q
q t q
dq t


 
   




                     


. 
 
Definition 1: A strategy q  is said to be a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the recurrent 
preemption game if 
    ( ) ( , )V q V t q  for all [0,1]t . 
 
2.2. Specification and Uniqueness 
 
 I specify a strategy ˆ ˆ( | , )Wq q     as follows: 
(3)    (1 )ˆ( ) 1 (1 ) (1 2 )
W
W W
tq t
t

   
      for all ˆ[ ,1]t t , 
and 
    ˆ( ) 0q t   for all ˆ[0, )t t , 
where the critical time ˆ ˆ( , ) (0,1)Wt t     is defined as 
(4)    (1 )ˆ W
W
t  
    if 11 W
    , 
and 
    ˆ 1t      if 0 1W
    . 
Note that qˆ  is independent of  . The following theorem shows that qˆ  is the unique 
symmetric Nash equilibrium irrespective of  . Since a player has an incentive to select 
terminal time 1, I reason that 
     ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) (1, ) ( ) (1 )(1 ) ( )WV q V q V q V q         , 
that is, 
(5)    ˆ( ) (1 ) W
V q    . 
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Theorem 1: The strategy qˆ  is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in the recurrent 
preemption game. 
 
Proof: Consider an arbitrary symmetric Nash equilibrium q , where I assume that ( )q t  
is continuous in [0,1]t , and there exists [0,1)t   such that ( )q t  is increasing in 
[ ,1]t t   and ( ) 0q t  . From (1) and ( ) lim ( )
t
q t q  , the following first order 
condition is necessary and sufficient for the Nash equilibrium: for every [ ,1]t t  , 
    ( , ) {1 (1 ) ( )}V t q q t
t
      (1 2 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 0Wt V q q t        , 
that is, 
    (1 ) ( )1 (1 ) ( ) (1 2 ) ( )W
q t
q t t V q
 
  
     . 
From (1) 1q  , for every [ ,1)t t  , I can derive 
     
(1 )( ) 1 (1 ) (1 2 ) ( )W
tq t
t V q

  
     , 
which, along with (3), (4), and (5), implies that 
(1 ) ˆ( ) 1 ( )(1 ) (1 2 )
W
W W
tq t q t
t

   
      for all [ ,1)t t  , 
and 
ˆt t . 
Hence, qˆ  is the unique Nash equilibrium that satisfies continuity and increasingness. 
I can prove that if a strategy q  is a symmetric Nash equilibrium, then ( )q t  is 
continuous in [0,1]t , and there exists [0,1)t   such that ( )q t  is increasing in 
[ ,1]t t   and ( ) 0q t  . Meanwhile, if ( )q t  is not continuous, then there exists 0    
such that lim ( ) ( )q q     . By selecting a time slightly earlier than   , a player can 
dramatically increase her probability of winning. This implies that she does not select 
  , which is a contradiction. Hence, ( )q t  is continuous. 
From continuity, I can define 
    max [0,1) : ( ) (0)q q     . 
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Meanwhile, if ( )q t  is not increasing in [ ,1] , then, there exist [ ,1]   and 
[ ,1]   such that    , ( ) ( )q q   , and the selection of    is a best response. 
Since a player does not select any   in the open interval ( , )   , it follows from 
continuity that by selecting    instead of   , she can increase the winner’s payoff 
without decreasing her winning probability, which is also a contradiction. Hence, ( )q t  
is increasing in [ ,1]t  , where I can set t   . 
Q.E.D. 
 
2.3. Discussion 
 
 The unique equilibrium strategy qˆ  depends on the frequency with which the 
winner enters the next game, W . The following proposition states that the more 
frequently the winner enters the next game (i.e., the greater W ), the more 
competitively the players behave in equilibrium; that is, the less efficiently technologies 
are adopted. Hence, the prominence of the innovator’s dilemma eases preemptive 
competition and consequently promotes more efficient technology adoption. 
 
Proposition 2: For every ( ,1)1W
   , 
ˆ( | , ) 0W
W
q t  

   for all ( ,1)t t  , 
ˆ( , ) 0W
W
t  

  , and 
ˆ( ( | , )) 0W
W
V q  

   . 
 
Proof: From (3), 
    
2
2
ˆ( | , ) (1 ) 0{(1 ) (1 2 )}
W
W W W
q t t
t
  
    
      , 
implying that ˆ( | , )Wq t    is increasing in  . From (4) and (5), both ˆ( , )Wt    and 
ˆ( | , , )WV q     are decreasing in W . 
Q.E.D. 
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 From (3) and (4), in the medium case in which the winner and the loser have the 
same opportunity to enter the next game ( 12W  ), the corresponding unique 
equilibrium strategy is given by 
(1 )1ˆ ˆ( ) ( | , ) 12 (1 )
tq t q t
t
 
     for all [ ,1]t  . 
This is the same as the unique equilibrium strategy in the one-shot preemption game, 
that is, I have *qˆ q  in the medium case. From the specification of ˆ ˆ( | , )Wq q    , I 
have 
    *ˆ( | , ) ( | )Wq t q t    for all ˆ( ,1)t t  if 12W  , 
while 
    *ˆ( | , ) ( |, )Wq t q t    for all (0,1)t   if 12W  . 
Hence, if 12W  , then the introduction of recurrent structure makes players more 
competitive, while if 12W  , then the introduction of recurrent structure makes 
players less competitive. 
 The following proposition shows that the greater possibility of the rival being 
absent (i.e., the greater  ) makes technology adoption more efficient. 
 
Proposition 3: For every (0,1)   and ( ,1)1W
   , 
ˆ( | , ) 0Wq t  
    for all ˆ( ,1)t t , 
ˆ( , ) 0Wt  
  , and 
ˆ( ( | , )) 0WV q  
   . 
 
Proof: From (3), (4), and (5), it is clear that ˆ( | , )Wq t    is decreasing, ˆ( , )Wt    is 
increasing, and ˆ( | , , )WV q     is decreasing in  . 
Q.E.D. 
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From the specification of qˆ , I find that 
    0 ˆlim ( | , ) 1Wq t     for all (0,1]W   and [0,1]t . 
This implies full inefficiency in that the technology is immediately adopted without 
development if a player expects that a rival is (almost) certainly present. From the 
specification of qˆ , 
    1 ˆlim ( | , ) 0Wq t     for all (0,1]W   and [0,1)t . 
This implies full efficiency in that the technology is adopted after it is fully ripe, if a 
player expects that a rival is (almost) certainly absent. 
 
3. Random Technology 
 
3.1. Formulation 
 
I have assumed that the level of adoption value   is constant across component 
games. This section considers the situation in which   is determined randomly and 
independently across component games according to a cumulative distribution function 
: (0, ) [0,1]p   , where ( )p   is differentiable and increasing in  , 0lim ( ) 0p   , 
and lim ( ) 1p   . Players are informed of the adoption value of the current technology 
but not informed about the future. 
In the recurrent preemption game with random technology, I define a strategy as 
(0, )( ( | ))r r     , where ( | ) ( | , , ) :[0,1] [0,1]Wr r        denotes a cumulative 
distribution function according to which a player selects a time in any preemption game 
associated with  . I denote by ( ) ( | , )WV r V r    the ex-ante expected payoff in the 
recurrent preemption game with random technology. If the current game is associated 
with   and a player selects [0,1]t , then she obtains the expected payoff given by 
(6)    ( , , )V t r  ( | ) lim ( | )1 (1 ) 2
t
r t r
t 
           
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( | ) lim ( | )(1 ) (1 2 ) ( )2
t
W W
r t r
V r
                   
. 
Let ( , )V r   denote the expected payoff associated with   when all players 
commonly follow q , which is defined as 
(7)    
1
0
( , ) ( , , ) ( | )
t
V r V t r dr t  

   
1
0
( | ) lim ( | )1 (1 ) ( | )2
t
t
r t r
t dr t
    

         
1
0
( | ) lim ( | )( ) (1 ) (1 2 ) ( | )2
t
W W
t
r t r
V r dr t
      

               . 
I define the ex-ante expected payoff in the recurrent preemption game with random 
technology as 
(8)    ( ) [ ( , )]V r E V r   
1
0
1
0
( | ) lim ( | )1 (1 ) ( )2
( | ) lim ( | )1 (1 ) (1 2 ) ( )2
t
t
t
W W
t
r t r
E t dr t
r t r
E dr t




   
     




                              


. 
 
Definition 2: A strategy r  is said to be a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the recurrent 
preemption game with random technology if for every 0  , 
    ( , ) ( , , )V r V t r   for all [0,1]t . 
 
3.2. Specification and Uniqueness 
 
 I specify a strategy (0,1]ˆ ˆ( ( | ))r r     as follows. Let us specify ˆ( ) [0,1]t   , 
ˆ( ) 0V r  , and ˆ 0   according to the following five equations: 
(9)    ˆ(1 )(1 2 ) ( )ˆ( ) W V rt    
   , 
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(10)    ˆ2 ( )ˆ( ) ˆ(1 ) 1 (1 2 ){1 ( )}W
dp
V r
p
  
  

      
   if 12W  , 
(11)    
ˆ
ˆ0(1 ) ( ) 2 ( )ˆ( ) ˆ(1 ) 1 (1 2 ){1 ( )}W
dp dp
V r
p

     
  
       
    if 12W  , 
(12)    ˆ(1 )(2 1) ( )ˆ W V r  
      if 12W  , 
and 
(13)    ˆ ˆ(1 2 ) ( )W V r         if 12W  . 
Based on these specifications, for every ˆ  , let 
(14)     
(1 )ˆ( | ) 1 ˆ(1 ) (1 2 ) ( )W
tr t
t V r
   
      for all ˆ( ( ),1]t t  , 
and 
ˆ( | ) 0r t    for all ˆ[0, ( )]t t  . 
For every ˆ(0, ]  , let 
(15)    ˆ( | ) 1r t    for all [0,1]t     if 12W  , 
and 
(16)    ˆ( | ) 0r t    for all [0,1)t     if 12W  . 
The following theorem shows that it is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
 
Theorem 4: The specified strategy rˆ  uniquely exists, and it is the unique symmetric 
Nash equilibrium in the recurrent preemption game with random technology. 
 
Proof: I show that rˆ  uniquely exists. For each ˆ  , ˆ( )t   must satisfy the 
following equation: 
     
ˆ{1 ( )}ˆˆ( ( ) | ) 1 0ˆ ˆ(1 ) ( ) (1 2 ) ( )W
tr t
t V r
      
     , 
which implies (9). For rˆ  to satisfy the Nash equilibrium property, the selection of 
terminal time 1 must be the best response to ˆ( | )r   for each ˆ  . Hence, 
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(17)     ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) (1, , ) (1 )(1 ) ( )WV r V r V r           . 
Consider 12W  . Equation (15) makes clear that for each ˆ(0, ]  , a player 
must have an incentive to select 0, which implies 
    1ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) (0, , ) ( )2V r V r V r
    . 
Hence, from (17), 
    ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( | , ) [ ( , )]WV r V r E V r     
  ˆ 1 ˆ ˆˆ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 )(1 ) 1 ( )2 Wdp V r p p                   , 
which implies (10). Since ˆˆ( ) 0t    and (9), I have (12). From (10) and (12), 
(18)    ˆˆ ˆ1 (1 2 ){1 ( )} 2(1 2 ) ( ) 0W Wp dp     
         , 
which determines ˆ . Such ˆ  uniquely exists because the left-hand side of (18) is 
continuous in ˆ , increasing in ˆ , negative for ˆ 0  , and positive for sufficient ˆ . 
Hence, as per Equations (9), (10), and (12), ˆ( )t  , ˆ( )V r , and rˆ  are all uniquely 
defined. 
Consider 12W  . Equation (16) makes clear that for each ˆ(0, )  , no player 
must have an incentive for a time before 1, which implies 
     1ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) (1, , ) ( )2V r V r V r
     . 
Hence, from (A-1), 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( | , ) ( , )WV r V r E V r   
ˆ
ˆ0(1 ) ( ) 2 ( )
ˆ(1 ) 1 (1 2 ){1 ( )}W
dp dp
p

     
  
       
  , 
which implies (11). Since ˆˆ( ) 1t    and (9), I have (13). From (11) and (13), 
(19)     ˆ ˆ(1 ) 1 (1 2 ) 1 ( )W p          
ˆ
ˆ0(1 2 ) (1 ) ( ) 2 ( ) 0W dp dp

      
         , 
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which determines ˆ . Such ˆ  uniquely exists because the left-hand side of (19) is 
continuous in ˆ , increasing in ˆ , negative for ˆ 0  , and positive for sufficient ˆ . 
Hence, as per Equations (9), (11), and (13), ˆ( )t  , ˆ( )V q , and rˆ  are all uniquely 
defined. Note that ˆ( | )r t   is continuous in [0,1]t , irrespective of  . 
 The above observations prove that rˆ  uniquely exists. 
 Notably, rˆ  is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium. Suppose 12W   and 
consider an arbitrary symmetric Nash equilibrium r  that I assume is continuous in 
[0,1)t  and there exists 0   such that 
(0 | ) 1r    for all [0, )   , 
and, moreover, for each    , there exists ( ) [0,1)t    such that ( | )r t   is 
increasing in [ ,1]t t   and ( ( ) | ) 0r t    . Consider    . From Equation (6) and 
( | ) lim ( | )
t
r t r   , the following first order condition is necessary and sufficient for 
the Nash equilibrium: for every [ ( ),1]t t   , 
     ( , , ) 1 (1 ) ( | )V t r r t
t
        
     (1 2 ) ( ) (1 ) ( | ) 0Wt V r r t        . 
As in the proof for Theorem 1, it follows from the unique specification of rˆ  that 
ˆ( ) ( )V r V r , 
for every [ ( ),1)t t   , 
     
(1 )( | ) 1 (1 ) (1 2 ) ( )W
tr t
t V r
   
     ˆ( | )r t  , 
and ˆ( ) ( )t t  , where, since a player has an incentive to select 1 if and only if ˆ  , 
we have ˆ  . These observations imply that rˆ  is the unique symmetric Nash 
equilibrium. 
Suppose 12W   and consider an arbitrary symmetric Nash equilibrium r  that 
I assume is continuous in [0,1)t and there exists 0   such that 
( | ) 0r t    for all [0, )    and [0,1)t , 
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and, for each    , there exists ( ) [0,1)t    such that ( | )r t   is increasing in 
[ ,1]t t   and ( ( ) | ) 0r t    . In the same manner as in the case of 12W  , 
ˆ( | ) ( | )r r     for all    , 
where, since a player has an incentive to select 1 irrespective of her rival’s strategy if 
and only if ˆ  , we have ˆ  , and ( | ) 0r t    for all 1t   and ˆ  . These 
observations imply that rˆ  is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
 As in the proof for Theorem 1, any symmetric Nash equilibrium satisfies 
continuity and increasingness. Hence, the above work proves Theorem 4. 
Q.E.D. 
 
3.3. Discussion 
 
 The unique equilibrium strategy ˆ( | )r   crucially depends on  . The reason for 
this dependence is that the relative importance of the future expected payoff after 
entering the next game, compared to the winner’s payoff in the current game, decreases 
as the current level of adoption value increases. Importantly, the manner of dependence 
of ˆ( | )r   on   substantially differs between 12W   and 12W  . This 
subsection will show that if 12W  , then the greater the level of adoption value  , 
the less competitive a player will behave; meanwhile, if 12W  , then the greater the 
level of adoption value  , the more competitive a player behaves. 
Suppose that the level of adoption value is insufficient, that is, ˆ  . Accordingly, 
Equation (15) suggests that if 12W  , then players are so competitive, act 
immediately, and therefore adopt the technology without development. On the other 
hand, Equation (16) suggests that if 12W  , then players are so uncompetitive, 
postpone the timing to terminal time 1, and therefore adopt the technology with full 
development. The following proposition shows that this tendency holds even if the level 
of adoption value is sufficient. 
20 
 
 
Proposition 5: Suppose ˆ  . Then, 
1
2W
     ˆˆ( | ) 0 ( ) 0r t and t  
       , 
and 
    12W
     ˆˆ( | ) 0 ( ) 0r t and t  
       . 
 
Proof: From (14), 
 
2
2
ˆ(1 ) (1 2 ) ( )ˆ( | ) ˆ(1 ) (1 2 ) ( )
W
W
t V rr t
t V r
    
      , 
which is negative (positive) if 12W   ( 12W  , respectively). From (9), 
    2
ˆ(1 )(1 2 ) ( )ˆ( ) W V rt   
    , 
which is positive (negative) if 12W   ( 12W  , respectively). 
Q.E.D. 
 
Consider the medium case, that is, 12W  . Note that ˆ( | )r t   is independent of 
 , and 
    *ˆ( | )r q   for all 0  . 
In other words, the unique equilibrium strategy in the medium case is the same as the 
unique equilibrium strategy in the one-shot game. Hence, the incorporation of random 
technology does not influence the players’ equilibrium behavior in the medium case. 
Moreover, it is helpful to note that 
    *ˆlim ( | , , )Wr t q      for all (0,1)W   and (0,1)  . 
The equilibrium strategy associated with a sufficiently high level   is approximated 
by the equilibrium strategy in the one-shot preemption game. As in Section 2, if 
12W  , then the incorporation of recurrent structure makes players more competitive; 
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meanwhile if 12W  , then the incorporation of recurrent structure makes players less 
competitive. 
From the specification of rˆ  and ˆ( ) 0V r  , the following proposition holds. 
Notably, this proposition implies that the prominence of the innovator’s dilemma 
promotes more efficient technology adoption. I write ˆ ˆ( | ) ( | , , )Wr r      . 
 
Proposition 6: If 12W  , then 
    *ˆ( | , , ) ( )Wr t q t     for all (0,1)t  and (0, )   , 
while if 12W  , then 
    *ˆ( | , , ) ( )Wq t q t     for all (0,1)t  and (0, )   . 
  
In the same manner as in Subsection 2.3, the positivity of   plays a central role 
in making players delay technology adoption. For every 0   and (0,1]W  , 
    0 ˆlim ( | , , ) 1Wr t      for all [0,1]t , 
which implies full inefficiency in that the technology is immediately adopted without 
development if a player expects that a rival is (almost) certainly present. For every 
0   and (0,1]W  , 
    1 ˆlim ( | , , ) 0Wr t      for all [0,1)t , 
which implies full efficiency in that the technology is adopted with full development if 
a player expects that a rival is (almost) certainly absent. 
 
4. Generalization 
 
 I can generalize the winner’s payoffs by replacing t  with ( | )v t   without any 
substantial change, where I assume that ( | )v t   is continuous and increasing in 
[0,1]t  and (0, )   , (0 | ) 0v   , and (1| )v   . In the recurrent preemption 
game without random technology, I specify ( | , , ( | ))q q v       by 
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    ( | )ˆ( ) ( )v tq t q 
   for all [0,1]t . 
As in Theorem 1, q  is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, and the 
corresponding expected payoff is the same as ˆ( )V q . In the recurrent preemption game 
with random technology, I specify r  by 
   ( | )ˆ( | ) ( | )v tr t r  
   for all [0,1]t  and (0, )   . 
As in Theorem 4, r  is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, and the corresponding 
expected payoff is the same as ˆ( )V r . 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 This study introduced and investigated the recurrent preemption game as the 
infinitely repeated game with random matching, wherein each player’s discount factor 
depends on whether her rival is present in the current game and whether she wins the 
current game. Notably, the recurrent preemption game involves the unique symmetric 
Nash equilibrium. This paper clarified the impact of the innovator’s dilemma on 
equilibrium behavior from various viewpoints such as the degree of competitiveness 
and its dependence on the quality of technology. 
 It will be important for future research to generalize this study’s analysis in various 
respects. For instance, the recurrent preemption game can be replaced with a richer 
model that details a company’s internal organization and explains how the company 
addresses the innovator’s dilemma. Moreover, in conversation with previous literature 
on strategic technology adoption, my component game can be replaced with more 
general games that incorporate various aspects of asymmetry, such as the replacement 
effect (Arrow 1962), the informational spillover (Hoppe 2000; Mariotti 1992; Awaya 
and Krishna 2019), the preemption effect (Gilbert and Newbery; 1982), the imitation 
(Katz and Shapiro 1987; Hendricks 1992), and the uncertainty of profitability (Jensen 
1982). To be sure, sound policymaking requires such future studies, and I hope that my 
study of the recurrent preemption game provides a solid basis for such work. 
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